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1. INTRODUCTION
The emerging market crises in the mid 1990s re-
vived the discussion on the exchange rate regime
choice. More recently, discussions on the future of
the Chinese exchange rate regime or on the appro-
priate arrangements for the new European Union
Member States again highlighted the relevance of
this topic. The aim of this article is to go over the
debate on exchange rate regimes in recent years
both at the theoretical and empirical level. The sur-
vey is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a
snapshot of the recent trends in the literature on
the exchange rate regime choice. Section 3 summa-
rizes the main theoretical arguments regarding the
selection of regimes: the traditional approaches,
such as the criteria behind the “Optimum Cur-
rency Areas” theory or the nature of shocks affect-
ing the economies and the more recent contribu-
tions of the political economy or the “fear of float-
ing” school. Section 4 reviews the main contribu-
tions from empirical research, regarding both the
link between exchange rate regimes and macro-
economic performance and the determinants of
the exchange rate regime choice. Section 5 con-
cludes. The appendix provides a description of the
official International Monetary Fund (IMF) ex-
change rate regime classification.
2. OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In the early 1990s the core thinking in the litera-
ture on exchange rate regimes was that the need to
meet several objectives - flexibility versus commit-
ment, growth versus inflation stabilization, and in-
sulation from real shocks versus insulation from
monetary shocks - pointed to compromise solu-
tions within the fixed versus flexible dichotomy
for emerging market countries and developing
countries(1).
In the second half of the 1990s the sustainability
of policies, credibility and crisis prevention began
to be viewed as key criteria for judging exchange
rate regimes. The idea that bipolar choices, either
hard pegs or floating exchange rates, were better
than inside solutions gained increasing support,
basically on the grounds that intermediate regimes
were hard to sustain and more crisis-prone. This
approach has been called in the literature “bipolar
view”, “corner solution” or “hollowing out”(2).I n
the context of bipolar choices, the dominant opin-
ion was that floating exchange rates were more ad-
equate for most emerging market economies, with
hard pegs reserved for special conditions. Hard
pegs were regarded sustainable only if supported
by a strong national consensus, and, as such, un-
feasible or too constraining for many emerging
market countries. Underlying these arguments
was the fact that most financial crises, Mexico in
1994, Thailand, Indonesia and Korea in 1997, Rus-
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(1) See Aghevli et al. (1991).
(2) Original references on the “hollowing out” hypothesis are in
Eichengreen (1994). See also Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995),
Eichengreen (1999) and Goldstein (1999).sia and Brazil in 1998 and Argentina and Turkey
in 2001, involved an exchange rate peg of some
kind, while countries that did not have pegged
rates, such as South Africa, and in 1998 Israel,
Mexico and Turkey avoided crises of the type.
Given the concern to minimize the frequency and
severity of crises, the hypothesis that intermediate
regimes would vanish became almost undisputed
for some time. The “bipolar view” appears to be a
corollary of the impossible trinity principle, ac-
cording to which a country cannot have three
goals simultaneously: exchange rate stability,
monetary independence, and financial market in-
tegration. Since financial markets have become
more and more integrated internationally, this
would inevitably push the choice down to giving
up exchange rate stability, or giving up monetary
independence. The empirical evidence on coun-
tries switching to corner solutions during the
1990s appeared to support this view(3).
However, what appeared to be a new consen-
sus did not last for long. In the late 1990s, several
authors started to question the “bipolar view”.
Frankel (1999) notes that while it may be true that
a country cannot maintain both exchange rate sta-
bility and monetary independence altogether, this
does not mean it cannot have half stability and
half independence, especially because between the
two extreme options of full capital controls and
full financial integration there is a varying degree
of capital mobility. At the same time, the strength
of the empirical evidence pointing towards corner
solutions started to be questioned based on the
discrepancy between the official “de jure” and the
actual “de facto” exchange rate regimes. Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002a) argue and empiri-
cally verify that while intermediate regimes are in-
herently more vulnerable to capital flows, and
therefore bound to disappear in a world with in-
creasingly integrated capital markets, the “bipolar
view” does not apply to non emerging market de-
veloping countries(4). In fact, the observed pattern
indicates that floats are less prevalent among this
latter group and that the movement towards the
extremes was almost inexistent in this case, sug-
gesting that exposure to strong capital flows may
be necessary for the “bipolar view” argument to
be valid. Even Fischer (2001), a former proponent
of the “bipolar view”, departs from his original
position by recognizing that developing countries
which are not very exposed to international capital
flows still face a wide range of intermediate ex-
change rate regime options. Mussa et al. (2000) and
Rogoff et al. (2003) refine the argument in favour
of intermediate regimes arguing that the fact that
less hard peg regimes may not be sustainable for
many countries does not imply they are not viable
or cannot play a useful role for a limited period of
time, for example, as a nominal anchor during a
disinflation process. In fact, successful disinfla-
tions from triple digit inflation have generally
taken place with the use of an exchange rate an-
chor, especially in countries with chronic mone-
tary instability. The exchange rate anchor some-
times takes the form of a very hard peg (as in a
currency board) but it can also be a “softer” form
of peg. Whatever the case may be it is necessary
that these countries find a way to safely exit from
the peg without a crisis(5).
The idea that, in the context of bipolar choices,
floating exchange rate regimes were more appro-
priate to emerging market countries was also
questioned by several authors. Calvo and Reinhart
(2002), proponents of the “fear of floating” view
argue that, because of worries about inflation pass
through and dollarization in the domestic finan-
cial system, sometimes coupled with credibility
problems, central banks deliberately avoid move-
ments in the exchange rate even if they officially
declare to be floating, which results in flexible re-
gimes that are managed as if they are fixed.
To sum up, the recent trend in the literature re-
garding exchange rate regime choice suggests that
for countries in early stages of integration to
global capital markets, a wide variety of pegged
regimes remains appropriate. For emerging mar-
ket economies, intermediate regimes can be useful
as temporary solutions such as in cases when
countries confront the problem of stabilizing from
very high levels of inflation. As permanent ar-
rangements for emerging market economies, how-
ever, the choice will more likely fall in a “corner”
regime, some moving towards hard peg regimes
(like currency boards or even full dollarization or
euroisation), while others will choose exchange
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(3) See Fischer (2001) and Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002).
(4) See also Masson (2000). (5) See Duttagupta et al. (2004) and references therein.rate flexibility. How countries resolve this choice
depends on how they trade off the advantages of
credibility, commitment, and reduced inflation
volatility on the one hand, and some monetary au-
tonomy and the benefits of reduced output volatil-
ity on the other.
3. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE
SELECTING THE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME
3.1. Traditional Approach
The theory of “Optimum Currency Areas”
(OCA) has been the earlier contribution to the de-
bate on the merits of the various exchange rate re-
gimes. This literature stemmed from the debate
on the advantages and disadvantages of fixed ver-
sus flexible exchange rate arrangements in foster-
ing price stability and insulating countries from
the various types of shocks. The OCA identifies
several criteria under which a country should
choose to adopt a single currency or to irrevocably
peg its exchange rate. Following the seminal con-
tribution of Mundell (1961) who noted that a suffi-
cient inter regional labour mobility within the area
could take over the adjustment role played by flex-
ible exchange rates, other criteria emerged like the
size of the economy and its degree of openness,
geographic and product diversification of trade,
inflation differentials with major trading partners
and the degree of business cycle synchronization.
Later on, it became apparent that a new set of cri-
teria was also particularly important for the deci-
sion to adopt an institutional commitment to a
fixed rate. Frankel (1999) refers that a strong need
to import monetary stability (due to either a his-
tory of hyperinflation, an absence of credible pub-
lic institutions, or unusually large exposure to in-
ternational investors) and the desire for further
close integration with a particular neighbour or
trading partner may explain the desire to fix ex-
change rates. However, he also argues that this is
unlikely to be successful without the economy
having an adequate level of foreign reserves, a
strong and well supervised financial system, as
well as fiscal discipline. These additional charac-
teristics have to do with credibility and the need to
secure access to international financial markets.
That might explain for instance why the new
Member States of the European Union have cho-
sen various types of exchange rate regimes(6). Also
within the Mercado Comun del Cono Sur (Mercosur)
and the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) groups, the desire to stabilize intra re-
gional exchange rates to foster trade and capital
flows may call for avoiding exchange rate swings
between integrating countries(7).
Another strand of the more traditional litera-
ture emphasizes the importance of the nature of
shocks(8). The primary element is to identify which
regime would be better in stabilizing macroeco-
nomic performance, that is to reduce output vola-
tility or in controlling inflation, in the presence of
specific shocks. In this context, where domestic
shocks are largely monetary in nature then fixed
exchange rates are preferable because they help to
discipline erratic policy makers. If shocks are
mostly real or external, however, then flexibility is
important to stabilize economy.
3.2. Recent contributions
The most recent contributions date from the
mid-1990s and can be grouped under two main
headings: political economy and “fear of floating”.
The first approach appeared with Collins (1996)
and Edwards (1996) who argue that there are po-
litical economy considerations that affect the
choice of exchange rate regimes. The authors find
out that political instability indicators such as the
frequency of government changes or the transfers
of power between the governing and the opposi-
tion party influence the choice of the exchange rate
regime.(9). The second approach, appeared with
Calvo and Reinhart, (2000, 2002) who emphasize
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(7) The Mercosur countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay
and Uruguay. The ASEAN countries are Brunei, Indonesia,
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Recently, the Bank for International Settlements (2003) pre-
sented an extensive work specifically on the economic, legal
and practical issues involving the introduction of a shared re-
gional currency or the adoption of a foreign currency. The com-
pilation of papers includes studies on monetary regimes in Eu-
rope Middle East Africa and the ASEAN group. See also stud-
ies of Bayoumi and Mauro (1999) for the ASEAN group and
Masson and Pattillo (2001) for West African countries.
(8) See for instance, seminal contributions of Aizenman and
Frenkel (1982).
(9) The study by Collins (1996) refers to 24 Latin America and Ca-
ribbean countries over the period 1978-92 whereas that by Ed-
wards (1996) applies to 63 countries over the 1980 1992.that many countries claiming to have floating ex-
change rate systems, do not allow their exchange
rate to float freely after all, and rather use interest
rates and intervention policy to affect its behav-
iour(10).
The political economy approach argues that a
country without political stability may have an in-
centive to let the currency fluctuate because it
lacks the political ability and support to take the
unpopular measures necessary to defend a peg. In
fact, the decision to move to a more flexible ex-
change rate is partly a decision to de politicize ex-
change rate adjustments. Collins (1996) argues that
in floating regimes (managed floating regimes in-
cluded) adjustments in the exchange rates are less
perceptible by economic agents and, thus, less
costly in political terms than a devaluation under a
peg. Edwards (1996) refers that the more politi-
cally unstable countries are, the lower the proba-
bility of selecting a pegged exchange rate system.
In fact, stronger governments are in a better posi-
tion to withstand the political costs of a (possible)
currency crisis and, thus, are more willing to
adopt a peg.
The “fear of floating” approach relates to a situ-
ation in which a country officially declares to be
following an independently floating exchange rate
regime but actually smoothes the exchange rate by
means of market interventions, or interest rate pol-
icy. Calvo and Reinhart (2000, 2002) focus on the
presence of currency mismatches in balance sheets
and high exchange rate risk exposure as reasons
for such behaviour. These currency mismatches
happen because these countries face many difficul-
ties to borrow abroad in their own currency even
for domestic purposes and this implies that their
financial sector tends (needs to) to hold a large
fraction of their debt in foreign currency(11).I n -
deed, countries with high unhedged foreign cur-
rency denominated debt have an incentive to peg
to the foreign currency in which they have bor-
rowed since exchange rate volatility would trans-
late into financial and economic uncertainty.
Moreover, Calvo and Reinhart (2000) note that ex-
change rate volatility is more costly to trade in
emerging market countries because exporters and
importers lack the tools to hedge exchange rate
risk through futures instruments due to capital
markets incompleteness. In addition, Hausmann
et al. (2001) refer that emerging market countries
may fear floating because they worry about the ex-
change rate pass through to domestic inflation,
which if countries have inflation targeting frame-
works becomes even more important. However,
Detken and Gaspar (2003) cast some doubts on the
attempts to identify “de facto” exchange rate re-
gimes in terms of comparisons of unconditional
volatility of exchange rates, interest rates and for-
eign reserves. On the basis of a theoretical model
they argue that for a small open economy with
perfect capital mobility pursuing the objective of
price stability, a free floating exchange rate regime
can appear, under certain circumstances, equiva-
lent to a managed floating or even more interme-
diate regime. This happens in particular when
there is a large real exchange rate elasticity of do-
mestic demand and frequent shocks to the interest
rate risk premium. In this case the regime would
be falsely classified “de facto” as a managed float-
ing and in such cases the argument of “fear of
floating” would not apply.
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(10)Calvo and Reinhart (2002) estimate the probability of the per-
cent changes in the exchange rates, foreign exchange reserves
and also in interest rates in countries with regimes within the
third group of the pre-1999 IMF classification, i.e., managed
floating and independently floating, against a benchmark of
“unsuspicious” committed to floating countries: United States,
Germany and Japan. The results confirm that many of the
stated floats of the post-1980s turned out to be “de facto” much
closer to pegged exchange rate regimes, since they exhibited a
high volatility in foreign reserves (an indication of sizable sta-
bilizing intervention) and low variability of the nominal ex-
change rate. Finally, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) note that coun-
tries that end up changing their interest rates the most are the
ones that would be expected to move them the least, since they
are regarded as following a floating or managed floating ex-
change rate regime. According to the authors, this high volatil-
ity in nominal and real interest rates suggests that countries do
not only rely on foreign exchange market intervention to limit
exchange rate fluctuations but also use interest rate policy.
(11)This is the “original sin”: borrowers simply cannot borrow in
domestic currency, especially long-term debt, because no
lender at home or abroad is willing to extend credit in domestic
currency.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS REGARDING
EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES
4.1. Determinants of the choice of the exchange rate
regime
Most of the empirical work regarding the deter-
minants of the exchange rate regime choice con-
centrates on a particular aspect and a specific
group of countries. Special attention has been paid
to emerging market economies, in particular
within the Mercosur and Asia, and the transition
economies(12). As to topics, the question of partial
and full dollarization (the latter mostly in compar-
ison to currency boards) has often been the object
of empirical research(13). However, recently, Levy
Yeyati et al. (2002c) and Poirson (2001) have fol-
lowed a completely new approach, employing
models comprising a multiplicity of hypotheses as
well as a wider range of countries.
Using their own regime classification,
Levy-Yeyati et al. (2002c) test five main approaches
concerning the selection of exchange rate regimes.
These comprise the OCA theory; real shocks ver-
sus nominal shocks tradeoff; the political under-
standing that fixed exchange rates are a helpful
tool for governments with poor nominal and insti-
tutional credibility; the impossible trinity view;
and the implications of balance sheet effects on the
costs of exchange rate variability in financially
dollarized economies. Their results confirm that
all these approaches, from the traditional to the
more recent contributions, are empirically relevant
for the choice of regime. Moreover, the fittingness
of the underlying theories depends on the coun-
tries’ characteristics, meaning that there is a differ-
ence between industrial and non industrial coun-
tries. In this sense, perceiving the role played by
the countries’ specific factors becomes fundamen-
tal before recommending the adoption of a partic-
ular exchange rate regime. In fact as they summa-
rized “whatever the ultimate relevance of ex-
change rate regimes on economic performance is,
ignoring or not fully understanding the role
played by these variables and relying on fix-all
recommendations may induce ill advised poli-
cies”.
Poirson (2001), using the post-1999 IMF classifi-
cation of regimes (see appendix), resort to a large
number of explanatory variables to assess three
different theoretical criteria considered to be be-
hind the choice of regimes: the OCA theory, politi-
cal economy issues and the “fear of floating”
view(14). The results confirm that recently high-
lighted criteria, such as political uncertainty,
dollarization and exchange rate risk exposure
weigh significantly on exchange rate decisions. For
the traditional arguments, criteria like economic
size, inflation, capital mobility, product diversifica-
tion, adequacy of foreign reserves and external
vulnerability all matter for the choice of exchange
rate regimes; factors such as geographic trade con-
centration and economic development level, do
not appear relevant to the choice of the exchange
rate regime, or have only a small effect as in the
case of trade openness. In the case of capital mo-
bility, the findings confirm the view that increased
financial integration tends to promote more flexi-
ble exchange rate regimes. The results are consis-
tent with the “fear of floating” view, in the sense
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(12)Given the accession of the new Member States to the European
Union in May 2004, the IMF decided to drop the category of
“transition economies” in the World Economic Outlook issue
of April 2004. Formerly this group consisted of Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia and also Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania,
Serbia and Montenegro and the Commonwealth of Independ-
ent States and Mongolia.
(13)See for instance Berg and Borensztein (2000a, 2000b) or Calvo
and Reinhart (1999, 2000). Winkler et al. (2004) focus on the sus-
tained cases of euroization/dollarisation and also on those in
which euroization/dollarisation was abandoned. In Domac et
al. (2001) empirical findings suggest that transition economies
that are more open to trade, that have lower budget deficits
and that have made more progress in private sector entry and
internal markets tend to adopt stricter exchange rate regimes.
Berg and Borensztein (2000a, 2000b) or Calvo and Reinhart
(1999b, 2000) indicate that countries highly integrated with the
United States (or other country whose currency is to be
adopted) or already highly dollarized “de facto” are most likely
to find dollarization attractive. According to Bulír (2004) open-
ing financial markets favours exchange rate flexibility by in-
creasing the viability of a floating regime, as well as making it
more difficult to maintain a peg.
(14)An akin Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002a) approach is fol-
lowed when calculating an indicator of the exchange rate re-
gime flexibility based on observed volatility of exchange rate
and reserves for 164 countries in 1998. The index is the ratio of
the average absolute value of monthly nominal exchange rate
depreciation to the average absolute value of the monthly
change in reserves (normalized by the monetary base in the
previous month). The results of this index are then compared
with the new IMF classification of exchange rate regimes in
January 1999 and used to evaluate the determinants of regimes.that a high exchange rate risk exposure (measured
by the existence of unhedged foreign currency lia-
bilities) tends to be associated with less flexible ex-
change rate regimes. Also, countries with a high
degree of partial dollarization (understood as cur-
rency substitution) are more likely to choose a
more rigid exchange rate regime. Finally, both po-
litical uncertainty and a low level of foreign re-
serves appear to favour the selection of more flexi-
ble exchange rate regimes.
4.2. Exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic
performance
In contrast to the large number of theoretical
and conceptual discussions, few (and much less
successful) studies have empirically investigated
the links between macroeconomic performance
and exchange rate regimes. One of the reasons for
this incapability of data to provide a systematic
analysis stems from the problems posed by the
classification of the exchange regimes, although
this might be too simplistic. Below we present
some of the most conclusive works in this area. All
studies are similarly comprehensive as to country
coverage and period length.
Gosh et al. (1997) and Gosh et al. (2003) examine
the links between exchange rate regimes, inflation
and output growth(15). The authors use the IMF “de
jure” classification but combine it with a classifica-
tion based on the real exchange rate behaviour so
to differentiate between official and actual policies.
The results are drawn using the broad three-way
classification of regimes (pegged, intermediate and
floating exchange rate regimes), as well as a more
detailed one. The authors analyse inflation (mea-
sured by the yearly average inflation rate) and
growth performance (measured by real GDP per
capita growth), and also inflation and output vola-
tility. Additional control variables such as broad
money growth, short term nominal interest rates,
employment and investment to GDP ratio, dollar
imports and exports and the terms of trade were
included. To control regime choice endogeneity
they rely on a set of proxies for central bank inde-
pendence, namely the turnover rate of the central
bank governor. Empirically, the results are conclu-
sive as to inflation (both in performance and vola-
tility), while for GDP conclusions can only be
taken in terms of volatility and not in terms of the
growth rate. Inflation is both lower and more sta-
ble under pegged regimes than for the intermedi-
ate and floating regimes. The anti-inflationary ben-
efits of pegging the exchange rate arise both from
a slower money supply growth (that is the disci-
plinary effect) and a credibility effect. There are,
however, two exceptions: in countries with very
low inflation rates (generally high income coun-
tries) where credibility is gained from other mech-
anisms such as the absence of capital controls, and
in countries frequently changing their parities,
where credibility is low, it seems the choice of the
nominal exchange rate regime seems to have only
a small marginal effect. Evidence also seems to
point to higher real GDP growth volatility and real
GDP volatility under pegged exchange rate re-
gimes than under intermediate or floating re-
gimes, particularly in the case of higher-income
countries (where nominal rigidities are likely to be
more prevalent). Finally, regarding economic
growth performance findings are not straightfor-
ward. In fact, per capita growth rates do not vary
much across exchange rate regimes, although
there is some evidence that intermediate regimes
perform better than pegged regimes and floating
regimes. All in all, the authors conclude by saying
“perhaps the best one can say is that the growth
performance of pegged exchange rate regimes is
not worse than that of floating regimes”. In a spe-
cific study on currency boards, Gosh et al. (2000)
find out that in general, currency boards seem to
exhibit better growth performance than other
pegged regimes, but there is little evidence that
this could be attributed to the exchange rate re-
gime alone. Also, as expected, currency boards
outperform other pegged regimes in terms of in-
flation (both in volatility and performance).
Domaç et al. (2001) findings on transition econ-
omies over the 1991-98 period are in line with
Gosh et al. (1997) results, i.e., the exchange rate re-
gime does make a difference for inflation perfor-
mance, although it is not possible to take any con-
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(15)The first study applies to 136 countries over the 1960-1990 pe-
riod, while the second covers 165 countries over the 1970-1999
period.
(16)The transition economies in Domaç et al. (2001) correspond
more or less to the group of “transition economies” defined in
World Economic outlook prior to the April 2004 issue.clusions as to which particular regime is superior,
in terms of growth performance(16). Even so, the
results suggest that policy variables as well as
other variables influencing economic activity do
have different effects on economic growth de-
pending on the exchange rate regime.
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001, 2002b) us-
i n ga“ de facto” classification of exchange rate re-
gimes that reflects actual policies and distinguish-
ing between long and short pegs (where a peg is
defined as long if lasts for five or more years and
as short if lasting less than five years), found a ro-
bust association between fixed exchange regimes
and lower inflation rates, but only in the case of
long pegs (where the regime has been in place for
a period long enough to earn its credibility)(17).I n
addition, they found that hard peg regimes deliver
better inflation results than other types of pegs. In
terms of economic growth, this study concludes
that the exchange regime is only relevant for non
industrial countries(18). For these countries, float-
ing exchange rate regimes display significantly
higher growth rates than hard peg regimes. More-
over, floating exchange rate regimes also outper-
form short pegs. In fact, short pegs yield slower
economic growth without providing significant
gains in terms of inflation. Finally, compared to
“de facto” floating exchange rate regimes, “de facto”
pegs that discard the legal commitment to a fixed
exchange rate benefit from higher growth perfor-
mance (which could provide a justification for
what the authors labelled as “fear of pegging”).
Finally, Rogoff et al. (2003) using the classifica-
tion proposed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) exam-
ine the performance of exchange rate regimes in
terms of inflation and business cycles(19). Results
indicate that in developing countries, where there
is low exposure to international capital move-
ments, pegs and intermediate flexibility arrange-
ments seem to be superior in terms of policy credi-
bility and thus more suitable to achieve lower in-
flation. Additionally, it appears that this is accom-
plished with little cost in terms of growth, volatil-
ity, or more frequent crises. On the other hand, for
emerging market countries where the exposure to
international capital flows is higher, rigidity of re-
gimes does not appear to deliver obvious gains in
terms of lower inflation or higher growth(20).I nd e -
veloped economies, free floats record faster
growth than other regimes without incurring
higher inflation. Based on these results the authors
draw two main conclusions. First, the value of ex-
change rate flexibility is found to increase with fi-
nancial maturity(21). Second, the performance of
any exchange rate regime can be enhanced with
the consistent macroeconomic management.
To sum up, the abovementioned studies sug-
gest that there is no straightforward relation be-
tween macroeconomic performance and the ex-
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(17)Their classification of regimes, for a data set covering 183 coun-
tries that reported to the IMF over the period from 1974-2000, is
derived using a cluster analysis technique through which ho-
mogeneous groups of observations were identified according
to the similarity in the behaviour of three reference variables:
exchange rate volatility, the volatility of changes in the ex-
change rate and the volatility of international reserves. The au-
thors end up with four different groups comprising fixed ex-
change rate regimes (associated with changes in international
reserves aimed at reducing the volatility in the nominal ex-
change rate), flexible exchange rate regimes (characterized by
substantial volatility in nominal exchange rates with relatively
stable reserves), crawling pegs (the case where changes in the
nominal exchange rate occur with stable increments, i.e., a low
volatility in the rate of changes of the exchange rate, together
with active intervention in the foreign exchange reserves) and
lastly, a dirty float (associated to the case where volatility is
considerably high across all variables, with intervention only
partially smoothing exchange rate fluctuations).
(18)The 22 industrial countries defined in Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2001, 2002b) are included in Table II A of the ap-
pendix. Non-industrial countries with some exceptions refer to
Tables II B and C.
(19)The classification is more expanded (than the IMF’s) and incor-
porates information on dual/parallel market exchange rates.
This is important because by failing to look at market deter-
mined exchange rates, one often gets a false picture of the un-
derlying monetary policy and the ability of the economy to ad-
just imbalances. Moreover, it separates the episodes of severe
macroeconomic instability, identifying cases of “freely falling”
and “hyperfloats”: the first, equivalent to the independently
floating category in the IMF terminology is applied for coun-
tries whose twelve month rate of inflation is above 40 per cent
and accounts for episodes when, almost always due to high in-
flation, large downward shifts in the exchange rate occur on a
routine basis for extended periods of time; the second, a special
subcategory of “freely falling” accounts for episodes when in-
flation is over 50 per cent per month. This is also important be-
cause when countries experience situations of macroeconomic
instability they often have very high inflation rates and this can
be reflected in high and frequent exchange rate depreciations.
Hence, not excluding the “freely falling” episodes may lead to
distortions in any fixed versus flexible exchange rate regime
comparisons.
(20)It also appears that more rigid systems were associated with
more frequent banking and, especially, costly “twin” crises that
included both financial sector and balance-of-payments turbu-
lence.change rate regime. While, in may cases, pegged
exchange rate regimes appear to be associated
with better inflation results, it is not possible to es-
tablish a clear link between economic growth and
the exchange rate regime.
5. CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of the Asian and Latin Ameri-
can crises there was a strong belief that only fixed
or floating exchange rate regimes would be appro-
priate for emerging market countries. Further-
more, it seemed that floating exchange rates
would be preferable to hard peg exchange rate re-
gimes, since the latter were seen as too constrain-
ing for most emerging market countries. Later on,
these views have “softened” somehow, following
the recognition that intermediate exchange rate re-
gimes are viable and can be useful under particu-
lar circumstances, and also the observation that
sometimes countries appear to “fear floating”.
In the recent literature, the theoretical criteria
presiding the choice of exchange rate regimes have
gone beyond those emphasised in the “Optimum
Currency Areas” theory, or those related with the
nature of shocks affecting the economy. Recent
contributions comprise political economy consid-
erations and the “fear of floating” approach. Politi-
cal economy theories show that politically unsta-
ble countries are more likely to choose a flexible
exchange rate regime because they lack the politi-
cal support and ability for taking the necessary
measures to defend a peg. The “fear of floating”
approach argues that countries facing a high ex-
change rate risk exposure due to a highly
dollarized domestic financial system have an in-
centive to “de facto” peg their currencies, even if
they officially have a floating exchange rate re-
gime. Empirical studies suggest that both the more
traditional arguments and the more recent criteria,
such as those that put emphasis on the influence of
political factors, are empirically relevant for the
choice of the exchange rate regime.
The empirical literature has failed to establish a
clear link between macroeconomic performance
and the exchange rate regimes. This should not be
surprising. Indeed, the exchange rate regime is
part of a country’s policy package and thus its per-
formance and functioning crucially depend on the
circumstances of the particular country in a partic-
ular moment. In other words, similar macroeco-
nomic results can be achieved following com-
pletely different policy frameworks, within which
the exchange rate regime is only one element. All
exchange rate regimes are potential options pro-
vided compatibility with a wider policy frame-
work is ensured. So, it seems that there are no
clear-cut recommendations, nor any “straight
jacket” solutions regarding the choice of a particu-
lar exchange rate regime.
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The International Monetary Fund classification
The official IMF classification of exchange rate
regimes is a milestone in the literature regarding
exchange rate regimes. This classification was
firstly introduced in 1975, when following the col-
lapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, mem-
ber countries adopting the second amendment of
the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, were formally
given freedom to choose their own form of ex-
change rate arrangements while accepting that
their exchange rate and macroeconomic policies
would foster balance of payments adjustments.
The IMF would then keep countries’ exchange rate
policies under scrutiny and, on the other hand,
countries were expected to provide the IMF with
the information necessary for such surveillance.
Countries were obliged to notify the IMF, within
30 days of becoming a member, of the adopted ex-
change rate arrangement and thereafter whenever
there were changes. Based on these notifications
and according to the degree of flexibility of the ar-
rangements, the IMF drew the exchange rate clas-
sification scheme. This official or “de jure” classifi-
cation comprised three major categories: pegged
exchange rate arrangements, limited flexibility and
more flexible arrangements(1). The classification re-
mained broadly unchanged between 1983 and
1998. However, in the context of the debate on the
appropriateness of the so called bipolar choices
vis-à-vis intermediate regimes it became apparent
that several countries were following regimes that
were completely different from the ones formally
announced, which in turn reduced the transpar-
ency of members’ policy actions, and complicated
IMF surveillance over their exchange rate policies.
Against this background and following an exhaus-
tive examination of the “de facto” country practices
for the period between 1994 and 1997, the IMF de-
cided to alter its official exchange rate classifica-
tion scheme in 1999(2).
This “de facto” classification has been official
since January 1999 and includes eight categories
(see, IMF (1999) and IMF (2003)). The system ranks
exchange rate regimes on the basis of the degree of
flexibility of the arrangement or formal or infor-
mal commitment to a given exchange rate path.
The arrangements span from the more rigid re-
gimes or hard pegs, to the more flexible or floating
regimes, while the remaining categories are called
soft pegs(3). In addition to the exchange rate re-
gimes, countries are also classified according to
the monetary policy framework followed. This
provides greater transparency in the classification
scheme and illustrates that different types of ex-
change rate regimes are compatible with similar
monetary policy frameworks. For the monetary
policy framework the IMF distinguishes five alter-
natives: exchange rate anchor, monetary aggregate
anchor, inflation targeting framework, IMF sup-
ported or other monetary programme and other(4).
The IMF also provides additional specific informa-
tion, namely when the regime operating “de facto”
in the country is different from its “de jure” regime
or when the country maintains an exchange ar-
rangement involving more than one market, or has
adopted multiple nominal anchors in conducting
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(1) The first group included regimes where the exchange rate was
fixed against either a single currency, usually a major currency
as the US dollar and the French franc, or a currency composite,
described as a weighted composite from the currencies of ma-
jor trading or financial partners. The second group referred to
regimes where the exchange rate was allowed to move within
certain bands vis-à-vis a single currency or within a coopera-
tive arrangement (specifically applied to countries in the Ex-
change Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary Sys-
tem (EMS)). The third group included both managed floating
and independently floating exchange rate regimes, depending
on whether there was limited or full market determination of
the exchange rate (see IMF (1999)).
(2) In particular, the IMF (1999) analysed changes in the exchange
rate arrangements that affected the official classification and
other currency adjustments, namely devaluations in exchange
rates, changes in bands, the adoption of new currencies and
multiple currency practices.
(3) Hard pegs comprise exchange arrangements with no separate
legal tender and currency board arrangements. Soft pegs in-
clude other conventional fixed peg arrangements, pegged ex-
change rates within horizontal bands, crawling pegs, exchange
rate within crawling bands and also tightly managed floats (a
particular case of the managed floating regimes). Floating re-
gimes consist of other managed floating with no
pre-determined path for the exchange rate (excluding tightly
managed floating) and independently floating.monetary policy. Hence, the new “de facto” IMF
classification combines available information on
the exchange rate and monetary policy framework
and on the authorities’ formal and informal policy
intentions with data on actual exchange rate and
reserves movements to reach a judgment about the
actual exchange rate regime.
The evolution of exchange rate regimes in the
last decade, 1990-2001, under the IMF “de facto”
classification shows that there has been a trend
away from soft pegs towards floating regimes, and
to a lesser extent, hard pegs (Table I). This trend
might give some support to the “bipolar view”
idea that intermediate regimes will eventually dis-
appear. Indeed, the share of soft pegs decreased
from 64 per cent in 1990 to 30 per cent in 2001,
which corresponds to increases in the floating re-
gimes from 20 to 44 per cent and from 16 to 26 per
cent in the hard pegs(5). Also, the new information
regarding the monetary policy framework indi-
cates that as countries move towards greater ex-
change rate flexibility they tend to adopt addi-
tional anchors to ensure price stability(6). The sup-
plementary information also suggests that exclud-
ing the euro area countries, all other countries
with pegged exchange rate regimes use the ex-
change rate as nominal anchor in the monetary
policy framework. Finally, “de facto” exchange rate
classification indicates that the shift away from in-
termediate regimes has been more pronounced in
countries that have already gained access to capi-
tal markets, i.e. developed and emerging market
countries, and less evident in the other IMF mem-
bers.
The classification of the exchange rate regime
for 187 countries covered in the 2003 edition of the
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions is provided in Table II
where countries are listed in three groups: ad-
vanced economies, emerging market economies
and all other economies.
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(4) The IMF (2003) describes these IMF-supported or other mone-
tary programme as involving the implementation of monetary
and exchange rate policy within a framework that establishes
floors for international reserves and ceilings for net domestic
assets of central bank. United States, Switzerland and Japan or
the euro area countries are examples of countries included in
“Other” category.
(5) In the case of hard pegs this increase is to a large extent ex-
plained by the creation of the euro area.
(6) For a description of the issues and the recent experience in in-
flation targeting emerging market economies under flexible ex-
change rates see Ho and McCauley (2003).Articles






Hard pegs....................................................... 1 6 1 8 2 6
Soft pegs........................................................ 6 4 4 6 3 0
Floating regimes ................................................. 2 0 3 6 4 4
Total ........................................................... 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
“de jure”classification(a)
Pegged regimes(b) ................................................ 6 5 4 5 -
of which: limited flexibility ...................................... 9 9 -
Floating regimes ................................................. 3 5 5 6 -
of which: managed floating ...................................... 1 6 2 5 -
of which: independently floating ................................. 1 8 3 1 -
Total ........................................................... 1 0 0 1 0 0 -
Sources: IMF, World Economic and Financial Surveys (2003).
(a) Not updated since 1998.
(b) Includes arrangements with no separate legal tender, currency boards, conventional fixed pegs and horizontal






Germany With no separate legal tender Australia Independently floating
Austria With no separate legal tender Canada Independently floating
Belgium With no separate legal tender Cyprus+ Pegged exchange rate within horizontal bands
Spain With no separate legal tender Denmark Pegged exchange rate within horizontal bands (ERM II)
France With no separate legal tender Hong Kong SAR Currency board arrangement
Greece With no separate legal tender Iceland Independently floating
Ireland With no separate legal tender Japan Independently floating
Luxembourg With no separate legal tender New Zealand Independently floating
Italy With no separate legal tender Norway Independently floating
Portugal With no separate legal tender Singapore Managed floating
Sweden Independently floating
Switzerland Independently floating
Netherlands With no separate legal tender United Kingdom Independently floating
Finland With no separate legal tender United States Independently floating
Sources: IMF (World Economic Outlook (2004), Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (2003).
(a) Economies listed according to the IMF World Economic Outlook (2004), of which, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United King-
dom and the United States correspond to the major advanced economies.
(b) The new Member States to the European Union are marked with a +.Articles
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Table II B
EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES (a)
Exchange arrangement
Africa Asia
South Africa Independently floating China Other conventional fixed peg arrangement
India Managed floating
Indonesia Managed floating
Morocco Other conventional fixed peg
arrangement
Korea(b) Independently floating
Malaysia Other conventional fixed peg arrangement
Pakistan Managed floating
Nigeria Managed floating Philippines Independently floating
Sri Lanka Independently floating
Thailand Managed floating
Exchange arrangement
Europe & Middle East (c) Latin America
Bulgaria Currency board arrangement Argentina Managed floating
Egypt Pegged exchange rate in horizontal
bands
Brazil Independently floating
Hungary+ Pegged exchange rate in horizontal
bands
Chile Independently floating
Israel(b) Exchange rates within crawling
bands
Colombia Independently floating
Jordan Other conventional fixed peg
arrangement
Ecuador With no separate legal tender
Poland+ Independently floating Mexico Independently floating
Czech Republic+ Managed floating Panama With no separate legal tender
Russian Federation Managed floating Peru Independently floating
Turkey Independently floating Venezuela Independently floating
Sources: Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (2003).
(a) As in Fischer (2001), the criterion used was to choose economies listed in the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) for "Emerging
Markets" and/or JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI+) indices.
(b) According to the classification in the IMF World Economic Outlook (2004), Israel and Korea are included in the subgroup "other ad-
vanced economies".
(c) The new Member States to the European Union are marked with a +.Articles




Antigua and Barbuda, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Chad, Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Mali, Marshall Islands, Federal States of
Micronesia, Niger, Palau, San Marino, Senegal, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Timor-Leste and Togo.
With no separate legal tender
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Djibout, Estonia+(b) and Lithua-
nia+(b).
Currency board arrangement
Aruba, Bahamas, Kingdom of Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bot-
swana, Cape Verde, Comoros, Eritrea, Fiji, Guinea, Kuwait, Latvia+, Lebanon,
Lesotho, Lybian Arab Jamahiriya, Macedonia, Maldives, Malta+(c), Namibia,
Nepal, Netherlands Antilles, Oman, Qatar, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles,
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu and Zimbabwe.
Other conventional fixed peg arrangement
Tonga. Pegged exchange rate within horizontal bands
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Solomon Islands and Tunisia. Crawling peg
Belarus, Honduras, Romania(c) and Slovenia+(b). Exchange rates within crawling bands
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Cambodia, Croatia, Dominican
Republic, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova,
Mongolia, Myanmar, Paraguay, Rwanda, Serbia and Montenegro(d), São Tomé and
Príncipe, Slovak Republic+, Tajikistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Uzbequistan,
Vietnam and Zambia.
Managed floating
Albania, Armenia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania,
Uganda, Uruguay, and Republic of Yemen.
Independently floating
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (2003).
(a) The new Member States of the European Union are marked with a +.
(b) The currencies of these countries, the Estonian kroon, the Lithuanian litas and the Slovenian tolar, participate in the Exchange Rate
Mechanism II (ERM II) since June 2004.
(c) Malta pegs to a basket of currencies with heavy weight on the euro. Romania operates a “de facto”regime different from the “de jure”r e -
gime.
(d) The Federal Reserve of Yoguslavia was renamed Serbia and Montenegro on February 4, 2003.